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Abstract
We summarize the main features and results of the literature on mar-
ginal commodity tax reforms as initiated by Ahmad and Stern (1984) and
developed further by Yitzhaki and Thirsk (1990). We establish new links
with other ﬁelds of research, namely the literature on the use of equiv-
alence scales and the one on poverty measurement. We also critically
examine some issues associated with the implementation of marginal tax
reforms, with special refernce to the estimation of welfare weights and of
revenue eﬀects.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Thirty years ago Martin Feldstein (1975) noted that the knowledge of optimal
taxes may be useless for practical purposes since actual tax changes are ”slow
and piecemeal”. Consequently, he proposed to shift the emphasis from tax
design to tax reform. The latter was then deﬁned by Guesnerie (1977) as a a
vector of small tax changes which are ”feasible”and ”satisfactory” according to
the Pareto criterion. King (1983) noted that when revenue-neutrality is also
assumed the distributional impact of the reform can be easily related to its
eﬃciency gain (or cost). Building on this literature, Ahmad and Stern (1984)
investigated marginal commodity tax reforms deﬁn e da sv e c t o r so fs m a l lt a x
changes which increase welfare, as measured by a given social welfare function,
without decreasing revenues. Since the beginnings of their analysis, Ahmad
and Stern (1984, p. 261) state that the theory of marginal reforms is limited
in scope since it indicates directions of tax changes while saying nothing about
the size of the reform, and, furthermore, it leaves unanswered the question
of which (of the many) directions should be followed. Nevertheless, marginal
reforms have proven to be quite popular among the economic profession. Few
years ago Ranjan Ray (1997) published on the Journal of Economic Surveys
a comprehensive review on the theory and practice of commodity taxation in
which only 1 out of 6 sections was devoted to marginal commodity tax reforms.
Since then, however, the literature on marginal commodity reforms has rapidly
grown and now a considerable number of papers have been published on highly
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1ranked academic journals. This expansion has followed 3 main paths: i) the
implementation and the extension of the original framework designed by Ahmad
and Stern (1984); ii) the development by the daltonian school of an alternative
framework starting from a less demanding structure of welfare weights (Yitzhaki
and Thirsk, 1990; Yitzhaki and Slemrod, 1991; Mayshar and Yitzhaki, 1996)
and, more recently iii) the interpretation of marginal commodity tax reforms as
poverty-reducing policy changes (Makdissi and Wodon, 2002; Liberati, 2003).
There are two main reasons behind this academic success. First, as stressed
by Ray (1997, p. 367), ”marginal commodity tax reforms calculations impose far
less data requirements than optimal commodity tax rates”. This is particularly
important when available databases are relatively poor as it usually happens in
developing countries. Indeed, marginal tax reforms appear to be particularly
suitable for this kind of countries (Ahmad and Stern, 1987 and 1991). Second,
as noted by Feldstein (1975) and remarked more recently by Slesnick (1998, p.
1253) ”reforms are often restricted due, for example, to political considerations,
so that large changes in tax rates are infeasible”.
Despite the large number of papers written in recent years, a comprehensive
and updated review of the theory and practice marginal commodity tax reforms
is still missing. The ﬁrst purpose of the present paper is to ﬁll in this gap.
Our main motivation is that marginal commodity tax reforms are a policy tool
whose importance will be increasing in the nearest future, in both developed and
developing countries, given that direct taxation encounters growing diﬃculties
of political and economic nature. Our second purpose is to establish some useful
and interesting links with other ﬁelds of research, namely the literature on the
use of equivalence scale and the one on poverty measurement. Our third purpose
is to analyze more accurately than it is currently done some issues associated
with the implementation of marginal tax reforms, with special reference to the
estimation of welfare weights and of revenue eﬀects.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 are respectively devoted
to an illustration of the two main streams of the literature: the one originated by
Ahmad and Stern (1984) and the daltonian school whose starting point can be
considered the paper by Yitzhaki and Thirsk (1990) . Section 3.1 is devoted to
the analysis of some issues arising in the calculation of welfare weights. Section
4 explains how marginal commodity tax reforms are implemented when social
heterogeneity is taken into account and, by doing so, establishes a link with the
literature on equivalence scales. Section 5 reviews the literature on the econo-
metric estimation of revenue eﬀects of marginal reforms and evaluates its impact
on marginal commodity taxation theories. Section 6 considers the potential of
marginal indirect tax reforms as poverty-reducing policy tools, starting from the
analysis by Makdissi and Wodon (2002) and evaluating its implications with a
moveable poverty line. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
22 Marginal commodity tax reforms
Consider the problem of maximizing a social welfare function W(V 1(q,y),.,Vn)
where V is the indirect utility function, q are consumer prices and y is income
and where, for the time being, i =1 ,...,n are single individuals. Assume that a
revenue constraint is written as R =
P
c τcXc where R is total revenue raised
through commodity taxation, τc is the speciﬁc tax rate on commodity c and Xc
is aggregated demand. Denote marginal revenue from the taxation of c as with












This equality is just saying that the marginal social cost of funds raised
through commodity taxation (i.e the marginal loss in welfare relative to the
marginal increase in revenues caused by taxation of a given commodity) should





which is saying that the marginal social cost of funds raised through taxation
of l is not lower than the marginal social cost of funds raised through taxation
of j. Intuitively, in this case existing marginal rates are not optimal and an
increase in constrained social welfare can be obtained by increasing taxation on
j and decreasing taxation on l, keeping revenues unchanged. This is the idea
of a marginal tax reform. More precisely, a marginal tax reform (Ahmad and
Stern (1984)) is a reform such that, when (3) holds,
dτl = −dτj MRj
MRl ,dτj > 0 (4)
i.e. a marginal tax reform, while keeping total revenue unchanged, subsidizes
marginally l by marginally taxing j when (3) holds. Such a reform actually
has a nonnegative impact on welfare as it can be seen immediately by totally
diﬀerentiating W with respect to tax changes when (4) holds.
Two theoretical limitations, however, emerge. First, although it is ensured
that a marginal tax reform does not decrease welfare, i.e. that it goes towards
a ’good’ direction, nothing guarantees that the reform will reach optimality (i.e
that (2) is veriﬁed after the reform is accomplished). This implies that, even
when there is a unique optimum, there might be other reforms which can be
preferred to the one considered, and therefore external criteria to choose among
diﬀerent reforms, such as administrative convenience, political acceptability or
3reliability of estimated parameters, are called for (Ahmad and Stern, 1991, pp.
61-62).
Second, only the direction is speciﬁed, while the size of the reform is not:
(4) is just suggesting that taxation on j should be marginally increased and
taxation on l marginally decreased so that aggregate revenues are unchanged,
but there are many (if not inﬁnite) combinations of tax changes satisfying (4).
It is usually claimed that these theoretical limitations allow a marginal tax
reform to be less informationally-demanding than a reform aiming at optimal
taxation. This is an important claim which rests nevertheless on some assump-
tions that need to be discussed. Using Roy’s identity and assuming also that
dq = dτ for all commodities it can be written that
−
dW




















i is marginal utility of income for individual i and xci is her consump-
tion of commodity c, Xc is aggregate demand of commodity c and sci = xci/Xc
is the share of commodity c which is consumed by individual i. The following









i is the social weight of a marginal variation in i’s income while αc
is the reciprocal of the marginal eﬃciency cost of funds. The higher is the αc,
the lower is the marginal eﬃciency cost of raising funds through the taxation
of commodity c.I nf a c t ,α increases when the marginal welfare gain of taxation
(measured by marginal revenues) increases with respect to marginal welfare loss
when the latter is limited to ﬁrst-order eﬀect and thus measured by aggregate
demand before taxation (see Mayshar, 1990, pp. 266-67). Using (5) and (6),










so that a marginal tax reform is such that (4) and (7) are satisﬁed, and
it ultimately depends on the distributional characteristics (Feldstein, 1972) of
the two commodities and on their marginal eﬃciency cost of funds. Note that
derivatives of aggregate demands enter in (7) since MR’s depend on own and
cross price-substitution eﬀects (we shall return on this point in section 5). An
alternative presentation of (7) (see Ray, 1997, eq. (24) p. 367 and Madden
(1996), eq. (3) p. 559) is expressed in terms of elasticities.If the revenue con-
straint is ignored, only the distributional eﬀect is taken into account, so that
α’s will disappear from (7) which will then boil down to a comparison between
4the distributional characteristics of the two commodities (see Newbery, 1995,
eq. (3) p. 851).
It is important to recall that the use of Roy’s identity is valid as long as
marginal price changes are considered. While this assumption does not restrict
the theoretical scope of the reform as deﬁned previously, it does urge the re-
searcher to be particulary cautious when implementing the reforms (see section
3.1). The second assumption that was made above, i.e. dq = dτ, while common
to all the literature on commodity taxation, really rests upon the assumption
of either perfect competition or of a small open economy facing world markets
(Dixit, 1975, p. 109; Cragg, 1991, p. 126).
The framework constituted by equations (1)-(7) has been expanded in vari-
ous directions. Madden (1995) has amended it to take also labour into account.
This implies that, in principle, leisure enters the social welfare function and that
wage taxes enters the revenue constraint. If labour is not a commodity involved
in the reform (i.e wage taxes are not modiﬁed), then the α0s parameter in (7)
would be explicit functions of the eﬀect on labour supply of the marginal tax
changes (see eq. (11) in Madden (1995)). When wage tax rates are (marginally)
changed, revenues are modiﬁed accordingly and a very similar expression to (5)
is obtained for leisure (see eq. (10) in Madden, 1995). However, such an ex-
tension correspondingly requires additional information (data on hours worked
and wage rates).
A second development has been to include externalities into the framework.
In the most complete setting, Mayeres and Proost (2001) assume that an ex-
ternality may aﬀect both directly the utility level and the demand for diﬀer-
ent commodities (the latter is called feedback eﬀect). When externality enters
the utility level, (7) is modiﬁed since β’s multiply (not only demands for l
and j but also) the change in the level of externality induced by the reform
(see eq. (3) in Schob, 1996, p.539). Such a change depends upon the substi-
tution/complementarity eﬀect between the externality-generating commodities
and commodities l and j. On the other hand, when the feedback eﬀect is pro-
duced, also the α’s parameters in (7) are aﬀected. More precisely, MRc will
depend also on the marginal change in Xc determined by the change in the
level of externality induced by the reform (see the denominator of eq. (11) , p.
347 in Mayeres and Proost, 2001).
Another theoretically feasible extension would be to drop the complete shift-
ing assumption and to consider a forward shifting rate ρc = dqc/dτc 6=1 ,c= j,l.
This would imply to divide αj and αl in (7) by the respective shifting rate. Fur-
ther steps would depend on the nature of the market considered. Seade (1985)
shows that, if there is imperfect competition between symmetric ﬁrms, the for-
ward shifting rate will be higher than 1 when the elasticity of the slope of the
inverse demand function for the given sector is higher than 1. In a similar vein,
Stern (1987, pp. 72-73) argues that the forward shifting rate in non competitive
markets depends not only on the elasticity of demand, but also on ”the elasticity
of elasticity”. A large set of data should thus be available to drop the complete
shifting assumption. Moreover, Stern argues that the assumption of complete
forward shifting may be less implausible than what it seems at a ﬁrst glance
5(Stern, 1987, p. 73).
Turning back to (7), it can be noted that four items of information are
required:
i) consumer’s demands (consumption levels);
ii) tax rates;
iii) welfare weights ;
iv) aggregate direct demand derivatives or, equivalently, elasticities of these
aggregate demands .
Overall, these requirements are far less demanding than those for optimal
tax rates. Items i) and ii) are standard in indirect tax analysis, although they
might not be easy to obtain in empirical applications. A typical diﬃculty, for
example, is given by tax systems where there a number of implicit taxes such
as import duties and excise taxes (see Ahmad and Stern, 1991, pp. 116-122,
for a discussion and treatment). Items iii) and iv), however, are more central
to the literature considered in this paper. For expositional convenience, we ﬁrst
examine the choice of welfare weights.
3W e l f a r e w e i g h t s
Ahmad and Stern (1984) calculate the welfare weights by taking a utility func-














Assuming k =1and imposing a normalization such that β1 = y
−ε
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Once welfare weights are speciﬁed, and provided items i), ii) and iv) are all
available, a welfare judgement concerning diﬀerent reforms can be given. Note
that if there are more than 2 commodities they can be ranked by calculating
the value of θ for each commodity and for every value of the inequality aversion
parameter. We deﬁne the latter as the ’ranking commodities’ procedure (not
to be confused with the ranking of individuals or households that we will be
discussing next) and will examine it in section 5.
A large part of the literature has followed Ahmad and Stern imposing a well
speciﬁed weighting function: among the most recent examples, βi =( yi)
−ε has
been used, although in a socially heterogeneous context (see nex section), by
Kaplanoglou and Newbery (2004, p. 239); Creedy (2001; p. 462) and Liberati
6(2001; p. 33). Clearly, one may conceive other social welfare functions, such as,
for example, the Kolm-Pollack utility function (Cragg, 1991, p. 131).
However, a diﬀerent approach has been proposed by Shlomo Yitzhaki and his
associates in a number of papers published in the Nineties (Yitzhaki and Thirsk,
1990; Yitzhaki, 1990; Yitzhaki and Slemrod, 1991; Mayshar and Yitzhaki, 1995;
Yitzhaki and Lewis, 1996; Yitzhaki, 1997). According to Mayshar and Yitzhaki
(1995, p. 793) ”two schemes have been utilized to tackle the value-judgement
requirement” in the literature on tax reforms:
1) the Paretian approach which ”seeks to avoid the need for welfare compar-
isons altogether”. In practice, this approach will yield no results, since reforms
must beneﬁte v e r y o n et ob ea p p r o v e d .
2) the Ahmad and Stern’s approach based on ”imposing an arbitrary struc-
ture of social welfare to enable interhousehold comparisons”.
Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995) propose an intermediate approach based on
the assumption that ”there exists some observable characteristic (...) by which
households can be socially ranked”. This is similar to the daltonian criterion in
that it requires only a rank and not a measurement of social welfare. Moreover,
marginal reforms should ensure that no reranking is caused. For these reasons
this stream of literature is called the daltonian school in the following. To
see what contribution is provided by the daltonian school, assume that the n
individuals are ranked according to a speciﬁed criterion. For example, when
income is used one has
y1 <y 2 < ... < yn,i=1 ,...n (11)
and it can be assumed that
β
1 ≥ β
2 ≥ ... ≥ β
n ≥ 0,i=1 ,...n (12)
Now, when (12) is the only available information about weights, (7) cannot
be computed. However, a new set of suﬃcient conditions for a marginal increase





idyi ≥ 0 (13)
where dyi is the variation of equivalent income i.e the variation of income
which is equivalent, in utility terms, to the variation of prices. From Roy’s
identity and using also the revenue neutrality condition (see (4) above) it can




































≥ 0;i,k =1 ,...,n (16)
Now, combining (14) and (16), and recalling from (4) that dτl < 0, it is








≥ 0,k=1 ,...,n (17)
is suﬃcient to satisfy (13) (as claimed ﬁrstly by Yitzhaki and Thirsk, 1990,





is always non-negative when assumption (12) holds.
Summing up, a daltonian tax reform is a reform which, when (17) holds,
changes the marginal tax rates as indicated in (4). While (7) , i.e the condition
for a marginal tax reform, is a comparison between values of total consumption
of two commodities (so it is a comparison between two numbers), (17) is a com-
parison between values of shares of consumption of two commodities evaluated
at all possible ranks, starting from the lowest. The share of consumption of a
given commodity at a given rank is the value of the concentration curve of that
commodity at the given rank: it indicates how much of the good is consumed
by the poorest decile, by the poorest 20% and so on until all the population is
considered (see Kakwani, 1977 for a formal treatment of concentration curves).
So, (17) requires dominance of the concentration curve for commodity l with
respect to the concentration curve for commodity j.
There are a number of feasible extensions of the daltonian school’s approach.
Lundin (2001) has included aggregate externalities into the analysis, basically
following the approach by Schob (1996) and thus ignoring any feedback eﬀect
as the one considered by Mayeres and Proost (2001). As already argued in
previous section, this means that the externality enters the utility function and
therefore the expression for dyi in (14) should be modiﬁed by considering not
only (individual and aggregate) demands but also marginal changes in utilities
caused by marginal changes in externalities induced by the tax reform (see
equations 2.5 and 2.6 in Lundin, 2001, p. 820).
To compare daltonian tax reforms with marginal tax reforms we may say that
the two are theoretically limited to the same extent but that the former is less
demanding, being based on an ordinal rather than a cardinal approach. More
precisely, among the items i)-iv) listed at the end of section 2, the daltonian
tax reform does not require iii), i.e the speciﬁcation of a weighting function.
Therefore, the ’daltonian’ approach may be seen as less arbitrary than the one
8on which marginal tax reforms were originally based. On the other hand the
possibility to evaluate the welfare impact as a function of an inequality-aversion
parameter may be seen as a source of ﬂexibility rather than a source of arbi-
trariness. To sum up, the choice between the two approaches rests ultimately
on researcher’s beliefs and priorities.
Whatever approach is chosen, the measurement of welfare weights raises also
some implementation issues that will be discussed in next subsection.
3.1 Implementation issues
In his review on empirical approaches to welfare measurement, Slesnick (1998, p.
2153) notes that the initial impression about the possibility to evaluate welfare
eﬀects of marginal price changes without estimating demand functions econo-
metrically turned out to be ”illusory”. There are two arguments supporting this
judgement, and they are both based on a previous contribution by Banks et al
(1996).
The ﬁrst argument is that ﬁrst order approximations can be quite inaccurate
for many price changes (i.e. tax reforms) that are of practical interest. In fact,
Banks et al. (1996, pp. 1234-1238) show that when a new tax of 17.5% is raised
on a previously untaxed commodity (clothing) to have a uniform commodity tax
system in the UK, using ﬁrst order approximations would lead to a substantial
bias in the estimated eﬀect on total expenditures. Large changes of tax rates
would require to use a second order approximation which would add a term to
the pre-tax demand level. This is equivalent to say that with large changes of
tax rates the calculation of the welfare eﬀect cannot be simply based on the
Roy’s equivalence, as we already know from our brief discussion in section 2.
Indeed, Banks et al. (1996, p. 1238) acknowledge that ”for small reforms (...)
suitable ﬁrst order approximations can work very well”. However, the results
obtained by Banks et al. (1996) emphasize the importance to be particularly
accurate in the selection of marginal tax reforms. The rule of thumb proposed
by Yitzhaki and Lewis (1996, p. 543) is to consider a reform to be marginal
when it does not change equivalent incomes by more than 10 percent. From the
work of Banks et al. (1996) another useful suggestion is to carry on a sensitivity
analysis on the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and the second order approximation
(on the basis of a Taylor’s expansion, see (equations (17) and (18) in Banks et
al. (1996), p. 1233).
The second argument put forward by Slesnick (1998, p. 2153) deserves more
attention. It is based on Theorem 1 by Banks et al. (1996, p. 1231) whose
corollary can be expressed as follows: the welfare weights β’s are independent
of prices (or, equivalently, are a function of income only) if and only if the in-
direct utility functions are homothetic. This means that if preferences are not
homothetic one should evaluate how prices inﬂuence weights, which, since prices
enter indirect utilities via marshallian demands, in turn requires an economet-
ric estimation of demand functions. Despite Slesnick’s remark, this result has
been ignored by the literature which has invariably treated welfare weights as
9price-independent. However, its impact should be considered carefully for two
reasons. First, homotheticity is hardly found in empirical applications. Second,
an homothetic indirect utility function yields unitary expenditure elasticities
for all commodities and, under such a condition, we know from Theorem 1 by
Kakwani (1977) that it could be diﬃcult to ﬁnd dominance between a given
pair of concentration curves. Therefore homotheticity should be excluded since
it is, in general, empirically untenable and, in particular, incompatible with
daltonian tax reforms. The importance of Slesnick’s remark, therefore, boils
down to verify how welfare weights react to prices when utility functions are
not homothetic. To provide some insights on this problem, we consider the LES
speciﬁcation of demand functions which is quite popular in the literature as we
shall see brieﬂy. The indirect utility function for this demand system is given









where, for every commodity c whose price is qc, bc denotes the necessary
bundle for that commodity while ϕc is the proportion of remaining income
which is used to buy quantities of c exceeding the necessary bundle, where
remaining income is income less the expenditure on all necessary bundles. The









which clearly is a function of prices as claimed by Banks et al (1996). Let
us now consider how β’s will change when (19) holds and the tax rate on two
commodities is changed, while prices on other commodities and dW/dV isa r e
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For a given size of the reform, i.e for a given value of dqj, the diﬀerence
in marginal utility of income depends on the absolute value of the diﬀerence
within round brackets. For example, for given initial prices and given marginal
revenues, the latter diﬀerence increases as the ratio ϕj/ϕl diverges from unity.
This is saying, for instance, that the absolute diﬀerence in welfare weights may
be important when the subsidized commodity is a necessity and/or the taxed
one is a luxury. On the other hand, ceteris paribus, the diﬀerence in marginal
utility of income decreases as dqj decreases. The latter remark is saying that the
smaller (the more marginal) is the reform , the smaller is the bias introduced by
ignoring the change in welfare prices, when a LES speciﬁcation of the demand
system is adopted. Thus, a LES is a case in which the claim by Ahmad and
10Stern (1984, p. 279) that welfare weigths can be treated as convenient ”local
approximations” even if they are not strictly valid for all prices and all incomes
seems justiﬁed. However, a diﬀerent outcome may arise when non linear demand
systems are adopted. Moreover, this approach overlooks the diﬃculty of choos-
ing the ’right’ demand system, which may depend, also, on price sensitivity of
diﬀerent speciﬁcations (see Ray, 1999, p. 702).
4 Heterogeneity
The interpretation either of a marginal (formulae (4) and (7)) or of a daltonian
(formulae (4) and (17)) tax reform must take into account the fact that con-
sumption units in the real world are heterogeneous households rather than in-
dividuals. We discuss here how the issue of heterogeneity is dealt with ﬁrst
by papers implementing the marginal tax reform approach and secondly by the
daltonian school.
Equivalence scales are used by the majority of researchers. While Ahmad and
Stern (1984; 1991) used simply per capita income, expenditure per equivalent
adult is chosen by Madden (1995) and by Liberati (2001) while real consumption
per equivalent adult is adopted by Newbery (1995) and by Kaplanoglou and
Newbery (2004). Cragg (1991, p. 139) uses a peculiar method to equivalize
data when households are aggregated in income classes.
While the use of equivalence scale is widespread, a complete framework for
the case of heterogeneous households is still missing in the existing literature.
We now brieﬂy sketch it by taking the structure of section 2 as our starting
point. Suppose that i is interpreted as a generic household behaving, as a whole,
as an individual, so that the Roy’s equivalence is still valid at the household
level. To write the formula corresponding to (5) for the heterogeneous case a
social welfare function must be deﬁned. Ebert (1997, Proposition 1, p. 237)
shows that, if additivity of W is assumed, there is a precise correspondance
between the equivalence scale that it is used and the social welfare function
that it is implied. This means that for every equivalence scale, an additive
social welfare function yielding the same welfare judgement can be identiﬁed.
In particular, when equivalent expenditure per equivalent adult is used, the
latter result is generalized as follows. Assume that each household i belongs to
ag r o u pg, g =1 ,...,G deﬁned according to the social features of the households
(size, presence of old or disabled people, and so on). Then choosing equivalent
expenditure per equivalent adult corresponds to (i.e yields the same welfare










where the monetary income yi is replaced by δ
g equivalent adults having
11each equivalent income yi/δ
g and where δ
g =1for the reference group (usually














and interpret ε > 0 as reﬂecting risk aversion at the individual level, the





This reasoning provides a rationale for using (24) when implementing mar-
ginal or daltonian tax reforms to socially heterogeneous context, as it is often
done in the literature (see for example Liberati, 2001, p. 33).
Turning now to the daltonian school it is interesting to note that, despite this
stream of literature originates from a refusal to endorse an arbitrary weighting
function, equivalence scales, which are arbitrary by deﬁnition, are often used in
empirical applications ( Yitzhaki, 1990, p. 780; Yitzhaki and Slemrod, 1991, p.
488; Mayshar and Yitzhaki, 1995, p. 801; Yitzhaki and Lewis, 1997, p. 551). It
is easy to see that by allowing for equivalence scales the daltonian approach in
the heterogeneous context yields a set of inequalities very similar to (17) . To see
why, it suﬃces to note that (11) is replaced by a ranking based on yi/δ
g,i∈ g.
Adopting equivalence scales is very convenient in empirical terms. Setting
aside econometric issues (see next section), and provided that αj ≥ αl, a neces-
sary condition for (17) when equivalent expenditure is used is that the concen-
tration coeﬃcient for commodity l is not higher than the concentration coeﬃ-
cient for commodity j.F r o m t h e d e ﬁnition of a concentration coeﬃcient (see
Lambert, 2001, p. 33) this provides a practical criterion to search for good






Xj ,i∈ g (25)
where F is the distribution of equivalent expenditure. Clearly, (25) applies
also to the homogeneous case by simply setting δ
g =1 ∀g. Inequality (25) can
have a number of diﬀerent and interesting interpretations (see Yitzhaki, 1997,
pp. 247-248 ) but it is only a necessary and not a suﬃcient condition for (17)
in both versions (homogeneous and heterogeneous). In other words, if a pair of
commodities (j,l) satisﬁes (25) they are plausible candidates for a reform, but
dominance should still be veriﬁed.
However using equivalence scales to implement daltonian tax reforms may
be somewhat inconsistent with the philosophy inspiring the daltonian approach.
If one does not like the idea to attribute welfare weights to single consumption
12units one might also dislike the idea that a money metric measure of well being
can be used to compare welfare of households having diﬀerent features. The
alternative is to apply to this context the sequential dominance criterion, as
done by Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1996, pp. 405-407) who also provide a formal
proof. We content here with the intuition behind their reasoning. If the G
groups of households are formed according to a variable measuring needs, say
n (for example, the size of the household) the household rank is a function not
only of income but also of n,s ot h a ty and n together deﬁne the living standard
of every household.This in turn implies that the total variation of welfare is
modiﬁed. More precisely, (15) should be rewritten by subtracting from the
variation in equivalent income of all households whose pre-tax living standard
is not higher than k’s the variation of all households whose pre-tax standard
living is surely lower than k’s. These comprise not only poorer households, but
also households having the same income but a higher n (see equation (8) in
Mayshar and Yitzhaki, 1996, p. 405). Having done that, (15) can be rewritten
by reaggregation (see equation (9) in Mayshar and Yitzhaki, 1996). Intuitively,
rather than comparing β
k only with the weight of the richer individual, i.e with
β
k+1, as in (15), one will have to compare it also with the weight of households
having the same income but a lower n and with those having both a higher
income and a lower level of needs. It turns out that the assumption which
parallels β
k > β
k+1 is the following one (see the last term in equation (9) in
Mayshar and Yitzhaki, 1996)
β(yk;nk) − β(yk;nk−1) > β(yk+1;nk) − β(yk+1;nk−1) (26)
where β(yk;nk) is the weight of a household having an income yk and a
level of needs nk, β(yk;nk−1) is the weight of a household having an income
equal to k’s but a lower level of needs, β(yk+1;nk) is the weight of a household
having the same level of needs as k’s but a higher income and β(yk+1;nk−1)
is the weight of the household having both a higher income and lower needs.
Inequality (26) reﬂects the idea that the society become less concerned about
diﬀerences in needs at higher incomes.
In practice, if (26) is valid, using the sequential approach in the implementa-
tion of (17) with heterogenous households would involve the following steps: 1)
form G groups so that the level of needs is homogeneous among all households
belonging to the same group 2) consider households belonging to the neediest
group and rank them according to income, i.e. from the poorest to the richest 3)
verify whether (17) is respected: if not the reform has an adverse distributional
impact among the neediest, if (17) is veriﬁed one can move to 4) consider to-
gether households belonging to the neediest and to the next-to-neediest group,
rank them according to income and verify dominance and so on until dominance
is veriﬁed and all households are considered. The advantage of this approach
lies not only in the fact that no arbitrary equivalence scale is required, but also
that if the dominance criterion fails it can be observed where this happens.
Nevertheless it is rarely applied in the implementation of daltonian reforms (ex-
ceptions are Mayshar and Yitzhaki, 1996, but only to illustrate their theoretical
13results, and Liberati, 2001, pp. 40-43) as it happens also in other contexts.
In his already mentioned implementation to the case of externality-generating
commodities, Lundin (2001, pp. 821-22) has extended sequential dominance
to three criteria to take into account the need to consume the externality-
generating commodity as an additional dimension (namely, the need to use
the car producing carbon dioxide).
5 Econometric issues
We now turn to consideration of item iv) in the list of section 2. As noted by
Ray (1997, p. 367) item iv) implies that we require information on demand
levels and elasticities (or derivatives) only at observed point of behaviour and
the (uncompensated) elasticities are aggregate rather than individual.
This means that we need less information than to calculate optimal tax
rates, but the problem of the estimation of own and cross price elasticities is
still present as it is evident in the deﬁnition of MR0sa s







where h is a generic commodity and h may be c.N o t et h a tMR0se n t e ri n
(4), in (7) and in (17) and therefore both marginal and daltonian tax reforms
depend on own and cross price elasticities.
In their paper Ahmad and Stern (1984, in particular pp. 277-78) use esti-
mates of aggregate demand elasticities coming from previous econometric stud-
ies where a LES speciﬁcation had been used. A linear expenditure system is
used also by Creedy (2001, pp. 482-85) and, in various augmented versions, by
Madden (1995, pp. 492-496). Other authors used semi-ﬂexible functional forms,
such as a normalized quadratic expenditure system (Cragg, 1991, p. 139), or
ﬂexible ones as the AIDS (Schob, 1996, p. 548).
T h ei s s u eo ft h es p e c i ﬁcation of the demand function arises naturally at this
point. A number of papers (Decoster and Schokkaert, 1990; Madden 1995; Mad-
den 1996; Ray 1999) argue that choosing the ’right’ functional form may be less
relevant when implementing (truly) marginal tax reforms following Ahmad and
Stern’s (1984) approach. In particular, Decoster and Schokkaert (1990, Table
4, p. 288) provide evidence that indeed single own and cross price elasticies do
diﬀer across diﬀerent demand systems. However, the outcome of the ’ranking
commodities’ procedure (see section 2 above) is not greatly modiﬁed, since the
Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcient between rankings of θ
0s derived from
diﬀerent speciﬁcations is reasonably high. Such a feature is somehow lost only
when simmetry (of the derivative of the compensated demand) is imposed, but
this theoretical restriction on single demands is questionable when only aggre-
gate eﬀects matters, as in (27) (for a discussion on this point, see Decoster and
Schokkaert (1990, p. 293)).
T h e s er e s u l t sa r ec o n ﬁrmed by Madden (1996) and to some extent by Ray
(1999). However, Ray (1999, Table 4 p. 700) qualiﬁes them in two ways:
14i) correlation is particularly high when a high value of the inequality aversion
parameter ε is selected; ii) correlation is low across systems embodying radically
diﬀerent assumptions on price sensitivity of the budget shares.
High correlation between rankings of commodities obtained using diﬀerent
demand speciﬁcations is a valuable result for the empirical application of mar-
ginal tax reforms. The original intuition by Ahmad and Stern (1984, p. 291)
that, comparatively to the implementation of an optimal tax system, ”the choice
of the speciﬁcation of the demand system is less important (although still impor-
tant) for the analysis of the reform” has thus been conﬁrmed. However, things
are less comfortable when daltonian reforms are considered, since these reforms
require dominance of concentration curves which is stronger than simple ’com-
modity ranking’. To be sure, this is the other side of the coin: daltonian tax
reforms are less demanding in terms of welfare weights, but more restrictive in
their dominance criterion. Now, it is the absolute value of MRc which enters the
dominance condition expressed by (17) (and its counterpart when heterogene-
ity is accounted for) and this value is directly inﬂuenced by diﬀerent estimates
of own and cross price elasticities. For example, taking the data provided by
Decoster and Schokkaert (1990, Table 5, p. 290) one can see that a reform
marginally reducing the taxation of transport while marginally increasing that
on durable goods would be approved using all the 6 demand speciﬁcations con-
sidered there. On the contrary, the actual value of MR0s (which corresponds to
the MC’s of Table 5 since they are calculated setting ε =0 ) considerably varies
across speciﬁcations. Nevertheless, the daltonian school usually adopts demand
systems withouth worrying too much about speciﬁcation issues: examples are
provided by Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995 and 1996) and by Yitzhaki and Lewis
(1996). In some cases (Yitzhaki and Slemrod, 1991; Yitzhaki 1997) the dal-
tonian school has assumed simply that αj = αl so that revenue considerations
were completely set aside. One may justify the latter when the commodities
considered are price inelastic and do not have neither substitutes nor comple-
ments. In this case MR= X for all commodities and α0s would be equal to 1.
This assumption appears to be justiﬁed only when necessities (food, some pub-
lic services) are considered. However it must be acknowledged that very simple
demand speciﬁcations sometimes yield results similar to more sophisticated ones
(see the diagonal speciﬁcation in Decoster and Schokkaert, 1990).
So far we have been discussing only about the deterministic speciﬁcation
of the demand function, which has been a matter of particular concern in the
literature. However, also the issues of dynamic and demographic speciﬁcation
deserve attention. Dynamic speciﬁcation may be important since consumption
patterns often display time trends and dependence on lagged values. To eval-
uate this issue in the context of a marginal commodity tax reform, Madden
(1996, Table 2, p. 563) examines how the Spearman rank correlation between
θ
0s changes when, given a demand system (namely, the AIDS), its dynamic spec-
iﬁcation is changed by inserting lags and time trends. The result is summarized
by saying that ”the choice of a static or a dynamic demand system does mat-
ter” and therefore there is a need ”for policy-makers to check the sensitivity of
tax reform recommendations” to the dynamic speciﬁcation of the model. Ray
15(1999) considers more carefully the issue of demographic speciﬁcation. In his
general demand system (see Ray, 1999, equations (18) and (19) p. 695), the
expenditure on a given commodity depends not only on the equivalent expen-
diture but also on the total number of children in the family, the number of
children in each age-category and the age-category itself. Of these, no one can
be excluded on purely statistical grounds, although Ray (1999) uses a nested
version of the original demand system where the age eﬀects are ruled out. This
points at a consideration of social heterogeneity which is much richer than the
one embodied in (25) and (26) since also α0s are seemingly aﬀected.
It is remarkable that, despite these results on the importance of the dynamic
and demographic speciﬁcation no other applied work has considered these issues
adequately.
6P o v e r t y
The most recent developments in the literature on marginal commodity tax re-
forms concern their interpretation as poverty-reducing reforms. Although some-
how anticipated by Besley and Kanbur (1988), this interpretation has been an-
alyzed by Makdissi and Wodon (2002) and further by Liberati (2003). Here we
summarize Makdissi and Wodon’s results, establish a link with the literature
e x p o s e di np r e v i o u ss e c t i o n sa n dd i s c u s spossible future developments of this





where z is the poverty line, yE is equivalent income y is direct income dis-
tributed according to F(Y ) whose density is f(y). Makdissi and Wodon (2002)
assume, following Besley and Kanbur (1988) that the vector of reference prices
used for computing equivalent income is the vector of prices before the reform.
This implies that diﬀerentiating with respect to y and to yE is equivalent (see
Besley and Kanbur, 1988, p. 708). Under these assumptions it can be shown
that when commodity j is taxed and commodity l is subsidized so that aggre-
gate revenue is unchanged, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a decrease











f(y)dy < 0 (29)
where sc(y),c= j,l is the share of total consumption by an individual having
income y. In its essence, (29), which is equivalent to (6) in Makdissi and Wodon
(2002, p. 230), is obtained by totally diﬀerentiating P with respect to yE
exploiting the fact that yE = y and using (14) in the continuous framework.
Makdissi and Wodon (2002) obtain their results for a measure p deﬁned
according to some general properties. However, for the sake of illustrational
purposes, let us assume that p is deﬁn e da si nt h eF G Tm e a s u r ew h i c hh a sa l l






,γ ≥ 0 (30)













f(y)dy < 0 (31)
The latter expression could be derived also from equation (26) in Besley and
Kanbur (1988, p. 708) imposing αl = αj.S i n c ew ea s s u m e ddτl < 0, (31) boils











f(y)dy > 0 (32)
Now consider two main possibilities: γ =1and γ =2 . In the ﬁrst case, the
FGT measure indicates the poverty gap, i.e. the amount of money necessary
to eradicate poverty. In Sen’s terminology it is a crude measure since it is not
sensitive to the distribution of income within the poor. If γ =2the FGT
measure is distribution-sensitive so that, for example, poverty would diminish









f(y)dy > 0 (33)
If γ =2 , Makdissi and Wodon (2002) use the fact that p =0when yE = z














dy > 0 (34)
The latter is the new condition introduced by Makdissi and Wodon (2002)
for a marginal reform to decrease poverty according to the distribution-sensitive
version of the FGT measure. Makdissi and Wodon (2002) deﬁne (33) and (34),
respectively, as second and third order consumption dominance curves. They
show that (33) and (34) are obtained also when p is the generalization of (30)
and that similar results hold for higher orders. However, orders 2 and 3, i.e.
(33) and (34) are easier to interpret and to apply.
Here we want to brieﬂy analyze the implications of (33) and (34) when a
moveable poverty line is considered, an assumption which is consistent with
all the modern analysis on poverty measurement. Suppose one can identify a
plausible maximum threshold z so that z²(0,z). This implies that both (33)
and (34) must be veriﬁed for all the values of z. It is instructive to note that,
if we denote with m(z) ≤ n is the rank corresponding to z and if we ignore








≥ 0,k=1 ,...,m(z) (35)
which is just (17) where m(z) replaces n. This remark justiﬁes the claim by
Yitzhaki and Lewis (1996, p. 544-5) according to which suﬃcient conditions for
a welfare-improving reform are also suﬃc i e n tf o ras o c i a lp l a n n e r” w h ow a n t st o
reduce the poverty gap and does not know who is poor and who is not”. On the











≥ 0;k =1 ,...,m(z) ≤ n;θ
i ≡ (k − i +1 ) (36)
There is a clear relationship between (35) and (36). First, (35) is a suﬃcient
condition for (36), which can be proven by considering that θ
i is declining in i.
On the other hand, in general (35) is not a necessary condition for (36), which
means that (36) may hold also when (35) does not. This is evident from the
two expressions, and it actually emerges also from the empirical illustration of
their method proposed by Makdissi and Wodon (2002, pp. 230-231). They
compare the expenditure on public transport and on medicine in Bolivia, and
ﬁnd that while (36) holds for all the values of the poverty lines that they consider,
(35) does not above a given value of z. This means that, by a poverty line
higher than this given value, a marginal reform subsidizing transport by taxing
medicines would not decrease the aggregate poverty gap in the equivalent income
space.However, the very same reform would decrease poverty as measured by a
distribution-sensitive poverty measure, as shown by the fact that (36) is satisﬁed.
This analysis suggests two things. First, using a poverty measure in the
equivalent income space and adopting a variable poverty line whose minimum
value is 0, a tax reform which decreases the poverty gap decreases poverty also
when the latter is deﬁned according to a distribution-sensitive poverty measure.
The second outcome of Makdissi and Wodon’s (2002) results is that, keeping
the same assumptions, decreasing poverty according to a distribution-sensitive
poverty measure does not ensure that the aggregate poverty gap is decreased
when these evaluations are made in the space of equivalent income and adopting
a variable poverty line.
These results, which may seem counterintuitive at ﬁrst, depends entirely
from the fact that a variable poverty line whose minimum value is 0 is assumed,
so that decreasing the poverty gap ensures that the living conditions of any
”aggregation of poor” are improved. An interesting development of this line of
research may be provided by a diﬀerent approach where Lorenz-dominance of
post-tax distribution of equivalent income with respect to pre-tax distribution
of income is required in place of a distribution-sensitive poverty measure. In-
tuitively, and taking into account Kawani’s (1977) results, this approach leads
to new suﬃcient conditions expressed in terms of income elasticities of diﬀerent
commodities.
187C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The theory on marginal commodity tax reforms, initiated by Ahmad and Stern
(1984), has been explored thoroughly and expanded in many directions during
the last twenty years. Its advantages are to be simple and intuitive, to be
politically viable, being based on small changes of tax rates, to be ﬂexible enough
to allow for many extensions and, last but not least, to be implementable at
reasonable conditions. The latter feature is the logical counterpart of the limited
theoretical scope of a marginal reform, which indicates only a direction for
welfare improvement without ensuring that it is preferable to other possible
directions and without specifying the size of tax rate changes.
The clearest indication arising from the present survey is that, while the
theory seems sound and well rooted in both its versions, i.e. the Ahmad and
Stern’s (1984) approach and the daltonian school (Yitzhaki and Thirsk, 1990),
there are still a number of implementation issues to be solved.
First, it is now clear that the marginal character of the reform is of a cru-
cial importance. A non marginal reform requires the estimation of second-order
eﬀects thereby going beyond the Roy’s equivalence which lies at the heart of
the theory. Moreover, a non marginal reform is likely to make the ”local ap-
proximation” of welfare weights less acceptable so that price-independence of
these weights would become an untenable assumption. While Ahmad and Stern
(1984 and 1987) have shown to be well consciuos of the importance to distin-
guish between marginal and non marginal reforms, the majority of the literature
is somewhat less transparent in its use of the marginal reform theory. Since it
does not exist a clear cut between marginal and non marginal reforms, a useful
step forward would be made by stating clearly every time what is the size of the
reform which is analyzed using the marginal reform theory.
Second, a statement about revenue eﬀects is also required. One may even
ﬁnd it acceptable that revenue eﬀects are completely set aside, as it sometimes
happen in the literature inspired by the daltonian school, so that the ratio be-
tween α’s is made equal to 1. If such a (radical) choice is not endorsed, however,
the issue of the estimation of local cross and own price elasticities is unavoid-
able. The latter issue has been treated mainly following the demand estimation
approach. The well known result (Decoster and Shokkaert, 1990) that diﬀerent
speciﬁcations lead to highly correlated rankings of commodities in terms of val-
ues of their θ’s, so that the commodities which are candidates to be ’taxed’ or
’subsidized’ by the reform do not vary greatly across diﬀerent speciﬁcations, is
limited in two ways. First, it does not ensure that absolute magnitude of cross
and own price elasticities do not vary across diﬀerent speciﬁcations, so that
dominance conditions such as those required by the daltonian school will proba-
bly change across diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Second, the observed high correlation
concerns only the choice of the functional form (the deterministic speciﬁcation
as deﬁned by Madden (1996)) but does not involve directly the dynamic and the
demographic speciﬁcation of the demand system (Madden, 1996 ; Ray, 1999).
Therefore, when the marginal reform theory is applied it might (depending
clearly on available data) be necessary to specify the dynamic and demographic
19structure of the demand system.The intrinsic diﬃculties in choosing the right
demand system may suggest to apply non parametric estimation techniques to
the estimation of price elasticities.
A ﬁnal remark concerns the recent literature about poverty-reducing com-
modity tax reforms. We saw above that the approach by Makdissi and Wodon
(2002) yields precise relationships between a reform which reduces poverty ac-
cording to a crude measure such as aggregated poverty gap and a reform which
decreases poverty according to a distribution-sensitive poverty measure. How-
ever, the use of a (although very general) poverty measure may seem too re-
strictive and one may prefer to turn to a dominance approach, i.e. an approach
in which Lorenz-dominance of post-tax equivalent incomes is required, together
with the reduction of aggregate poverty gap. Intuitively, this approach could
be built on Kakwani’s (1977) Theorem 1 and yield results expressed in terms
of income elasticities. Again, this line of research boils down to either correctly
specify the demand system or to turn to non parametric estimation techniques
of (price and income) elasticities.
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